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Customary (and Not So Customary)
International Environmental Law
DANIEL BODANSKY"
In this article, Professor Bodansky examines the creation and
importance of customary international law. He suggests that the
debate over the legal status of any given norm may be misplaced
Instead, he suggests that international lawmakers should spend their
time and energy incorporating norms, regardless of their true status,
into "concrete treaties and actions." The author begins his
discussion by providing a working definition of customary
international law. He asserts that such law can be based not just on
uniformities of state behavior, as is traditionally held, but also on
regularities in behavior. Thus, customary international law can be
formed even when states do not fully comply with a particular norm.
Next, Professor Bodansky contends that state declarations may be just
as indicative and useful in uncovering customary international law as
state behavior. But the author goes on to state that such "declarative
law" does not and should not carry the same weight as customary
norms based on state behavior. Because such norms are "non-
legal, "courts and other arbiters cannot enforce them against a state.
The author concludes, however, that these non-legal norms may play
a significant role in setting the terms of the debate, especially in
negotiations between states. These norms can then be incorporated
into treaties and other international agreements, making them more
concrete and enforceable. Ultimately, as the author states, the
international community should spend less time debating a norm's
legal status and more time translating general norms into enforceable
treaties.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. 1 would like to thank Joan
Fitzpatrick and Andri Nollkaemper for their very helpful comments.
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Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of international environmental
agreements.' For each new environmental problem, a new treaty is negotiated:
depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer,' transboundary movements of
hazardous wastes,' climate change,4 the loss of biological diversity,5
desertification, and so on.6 Although, the efficacy of these treaties remains an
open question,7 and their relative benefits versus soft law instruments are
poorly understood,8 most scholars consider treaties to be the preeminent
method of international environmental lawmaking. Through the negotiation
of treaties, states may develop detailed substantive rules and international
supervisory machinery to address particular environmental problems.'
The growing importance of treaties suggests a diminished role for
customary international environmental law. Nevertheless, many writers still
consider custom an important source of international environmental law."
Claims like the following by the distinguished German scholar Rfidiger
Wolfrum are not infrequent: "There is agreement in international law that, in
general, transfrontier damage is prohibited. This prohibition has essentially
1. Since 1980, the UNEP treaty register has increased from 102 to 164. UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, REGISTER OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD
OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1993); see also Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization
of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421,424 (1989).
2. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. 11097, 26
I.L.M. 1529 (1987); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550(1987).
3. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N.E.P. Doc. IG. 80/3.
4. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change,
May 9, 1992,31 I.L.M. 849.
5. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, opened
for signature June 5,1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
6. Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, opened for signature Oct. 14, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/15/Rev.7,
33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994).
7. Thomas Bernauer, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might
Learn More, 49 INT'L ORG. 351 (1995).
8. Environmental Law: When Does It Make Sense to Negotiate International Agreements?, 87 PROC.
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 377 (1993); Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms-A Meaningful Distinction
in International Relations?, 11 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 65 (1980).
9. E.g., PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 11,
84-85 (1992); Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 457,
470(1991).
10. BIRNIE, supra note 9, at 87; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the Existing Customary
Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLUTION 61 (Daniel B.
Magraw ed., 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
601-604 (1987).
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been developed under customary international law."" Scholars have asserted,
for example, that whales have an emerging right to life under customary
international law; 2 that states must take steps to protect endangered species; 3
and, more generally, that states have a duty to provide notice and engage in
consultations concerning activities that may cause transboundary harm. 4
Meanwhile, expert groups have spent considerable time and effort attempting
to codify what they regard as the customary norms of international
environmental law.'
5
True to their disciplinary training, international legal scholars tend to place
importance on whether a norm represents customary international law and
have spilled much ink debating whether particular environmental norms have
achieved this status. I recently participated in one such debate concerning the
customary law status of the so-called "precautionary principle.'
6
In this essay, I wish to step back and ask two broader questions: First,
what do we mean when we say that a norm is part of customary international
law? Second, does it matter whether a norm has achieved this status and, if so,
why? My preliminary conclusion is that much less is at stake than is ordinarily
supposed. Rather than continue arguing whether a particular environmental
norm is part of customary international law, international legal scholars might
do better to invest their time elsewhere.
11. Rudiger Wolfrum, Purposes and Principles of International Environmental Lav, 33 GER. Y.B.
INT'L L. 308, 309 (1990). See also id at 310 (Stockholm Principle 21 "is more than a policy programme,
it has to be regarded rather as a restatement of international customary law."); BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note
9, at 89 ("It is beyond serious argument that states are required by international law to take adequate steps
to control and regulate sources of serious global environmental pollution or transboundary harm within their
territory or subject to their jurisdiction."); Dupuy, supra note 10, at 63 (arguing obligation to prevent
transfrontier pollution is "well-established").
12. Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 21 (1991).
13. Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 30 (1990).
14. See Wolfrum, supra note 11, at 313; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 601, comment e; cf Daniel
G. Partan, The "Duty to Inform" in International Environmental Law, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 43, 83 (1988) (duty
to inform "has finally emerged as a legal duty of all states under general international law," although its
customary law status open to doubt).
15. See, e.g., EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1987). For a general discussion of principles of international
environmental law, see PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994).
16. The precautionary principle states that when there is a threat of serious or irreversible
environmental harm, lack of full scientific certainty should not be a reason to postpone action. Some
scholars have argued that the precautionary principle is part of customary international law, see, e.g, James
Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for
the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1991). 1 have remained
somewhat skeptical. See Daniel M. Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, 33
ENVIRONMENT 4 (1991).
1995]
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I. THE ORTHODOX ACCOUNT OF CUSTOMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW
In claiming that a norm, such as the duty to prevent transboundary harm
or the precautionary principle, is part of customary law, what kind of claim is
one making? According to the standard account of customary international
law, claims about customary law are empirical claims about the ways that
states (and other international actors7) regularly behave.'" States, for example,
generally grant immunity to foreign diplomats; refrain from exercising law
enforcement functions in the territory of other states; and do not interfere with
foreign vessels on the high seas. These represent significant regularities of
behavior--apparently normatively based-amidst the extremely complex and
often seemingly ad hoc interactions among states.
Anthony D'Amato, while departing in many respects from the standard
account of customary international law, has forcefully captured its behavioral
orientation:
To approach the subject of custom from the simplest starting point, we
look at the international scene. We could have expected to see
nothing but chaos and anarchy, everybody fighting with each other all
the time and nobody having any idea about what's going on - in other
words, Hobbes' state of nature. But instead we see regularity. We see
for the most part peace and peaceful accommodations....
So we say to ourselves: "Aha! Something's going on here that's
not explained." There is a systemic process here. . . . We are
witnessing ordered behavior....
Well, that's our customary-law problem: to figure out what laws
account for these regularities. And so we start looking at what states
do and what they claim. The laws could be anything. We don't
dictate what international law is; we look for it and find it out there in
the real world. International law is implicit in the interactions of these
state units. Somehow they're interacting in ways that tell us that
there is regularity there. If we were physicists we would say the same
17. For example, international organizations, transnational corporations and other non-governmental
groups.
18. Thus, according to the standard theory, uniform and consistent state practice is the basis of
custom. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (describing custom as a "constant and uniform
usage, accepted as law'). See generally KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d
rev. ed. 1993).
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thing. If we saw a bunch of microbes, and they were acting in a
certain orderly fashion, we would say that there must be some laws
regulating their behavior.... So today we're looking at states, and we
say the same thing-that there are certain laws that seem to account for
their regular behavior. 9
In saying that customary rules represent regularities of behavior, several
points should be noted. First, the approach is empirical rather than normative.
It attempts to describe the existing norms that govern the relations among
states, but does not advocate or prescribe new norms. Accordingly, it draws
a clear distinction between lex lata (law as it is) and lexferenda (law as it
should be).2"
Second, customary rules are not equivalent to simple behavioral
regularities. Behavioral regularities are like physical laws; they can be
identified by an external observer, whose "view will be like the view of one
who, having observed the working of a traffic signal in a busy street for some
time, limits himself to saying that when the light turns red there is a high
probability that the traffic will stop."'" In contrast, the concept of following
a rule has an internal as well as an external aspect: the red light is not merely
a predictor or sign of traffic stopping; it is a signal for traffic to stop. The
doctrine of opiniojuris serves to introduce the internal point of view into the
concept of customary international law: Customary norms depend not only on
state practice (that is, on observable regularities of behavior), but also on
acceptance of these regularities as law by states.
Finally, customary rules represent regularities, but not necessarily
uniformities, of behavior. The behavioral approach requires a general
congruence between rules and behavior.' If a purported rule says one thing
and states generally do something else, one can no longer say that the rule
"governs" behavior. Nevertheless, mistakes and violations of rules are
possible.
19. Anthony D'Amato, Seminar on the Theory of Customary International Law in INTERNATIONAL
LAW ANTHOLOGY 73, 74 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).
20. See South West Africa, 1966 I.C.J. 3, 34 (July 18) (drawing a sharp distinction between law and
morality).
21. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 87 (1961).
22. Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 4, 98 (June 27) ("The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary the
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.... [Tihe Court deems it
sufficient that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules ....").
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Although the concept of customary international law is often viewed as
mystifying,23 the emergence and application of custom are commonplace
occurrences. Language provides a good example. Every time we speak, we
apply an extremely complex set of customary rules of grammar and usage.
These rules are not legislated or enforced by any centralized body (the
attempts of the French Academy notwithstanding ). Instead, they emerge and
continue to evolve through the regular practice of language users. Like any
type of customary rule, they need to be identified and learned if one is to
participate effectively in society.
In ascertaining customary law, our task is similar to that of a legal
anthropologist who wishes to determine how an alien society works or of
someone trying to understand a strange game or a foreign language. We must
observe what actors do to see what regularities or patterns exist.' In watching
a football game, for example, we might notice that players' actions seem to be
divided into discrete "plays;" one side has the ball for several such plays in a
row; during each play, the ball can be advanced by running or passing or
kicking, and so on. Similarly, in learning a foreign language, we could try to
observe how natives regularly use and combine words. This is presumably
how infants learn vocabulary (if not grammar)-through induction from
observed behavior.
Do the purported norms of customary international environmental law--
such as the prohibition on transboundary harm-represent regularities in state
behavior? Would the proverbial Martian coming to Earth' be able to induce
these norms by observing what states do? The short answer seems to be
"no."" Consider, for example, the duty to prevent transboundary pollution,.
generally viewed as one of the most firmly established norms of customary
international environmental law. Although I am unaware of any systematic
empirical study of this issue, transboundary pollution seems much more the
23. See ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1971) ("The
questions of how custom comes into being and how it can be changed or modified are wrapped in mystery
and illogic."); G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHNKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1983); WOLFKE,
supra note 18, at xiii ("[]ntemational custom and customary law still raise the greatest number of doubts
and controversies" of any type of international law).
24. The French Academy was founded in 1635 by Cardinal Richelieu "to maintain the purity of the
language ... and to serve as the ultimate judge of approved usage." THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA
1012 (William H. Harris & Judith S. Levey eds., 1975).
25. Cf. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Inductive Approach to International Law, 60 HARv. L. REv. 539
(1947) (emphasizing study ofjudicial and arbitral decisions).
26. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGrrMACY AMONGNATIONS 41-42 (1990).
27. Cf. Schachter, supra note 9, at 462-63 (admitting that there is only fragmentary evidence that
international environmental principles are supported by state practice and opiniojuris).
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rule than the exception in interstate relations. Pollutants continuously travel
across most international borders through the air and by rivers and ocean
currents. In a few cases, states have undertaken efforts to reduce these
pollution flows-generally, through treaties.28 Leaving aside the question of
whether these treaties can create or are evidence of a customary norm, they
apply to the relations among only a small fraction of the 180-plus countries of
the world, and presumably cover only a small part of the total flow of
transboundary pollution." As Schachter concludes, "To say that a state has no
right to injure the environment of another seems quixotic in the face of the
great variety of transborder environmental harms that occur every day."3 °
If the putative rules of customary international environmental law reflected
behavioral regularities, then they would have a predictive function. Based on
these rules, for example, we could predict how a state would most likely
behave when considering an activity with potential transboundary effects. The
state would undertake an assessment, provide notice to and engage in
consultations with potentially affected states, and not proceed if there were a
significant risk of harm. Indeed, according to the precautionary principle, one
would ordinarily expect states to refrain from actions that have the potential
to cause substantial, irreversible harm even if significant uncertainties exist.
Would these be sound predictions of state behavior? Quite the contrary. If
one were a government lawyer providing advice to policy makers, reliance on
the purported norms of customary international environmental law as the basis
of one's predictions would constitute malpractice.
As a growing number of international legal scholars are recognizing, there
is a divergence between the traditional theory of customary law, which
emphasizes consistent and uniform state practice, and the norms generally
espoused as "customary."3' Robert Jennings has observed, "Most of what we
perversely persist in calling customary international law is not only not
28. E.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Nov. 13, 1979, T.1.A.S.
10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442; Agreement Concerning Frontier Watercourses (Fin.-U.S.S.R.), Apr. 24, 1964, 537
U.N.T.S. 231. If any behavioral regularity were in the process of emerging, it would be that states negotiate
treaties in response to transboundary pollution.
29. Schachter, supra note 9, at 462 ("Environmental treaties, though numerous, are limited in scope
and in participation. On the whole, they are not accepted as expressions of customary law and are regarded
as binding for the parties alone.").
30. Id at 463.
31. See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative
International Law, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 87 (1991); N.C.H. Dunbar, The Myth of Customary International Law,
8 AUSTRL. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1983); Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary International Economic Law?, 32
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9 (1989).
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customary law; it does not even faintly resemble a customary law."32 Torture
is said to be prohibited by customary international law33 even though it is
common throughout the world.34  Prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation is held to be required by customary international law35 even
though this formula has seldom, if ever, been applied by states in actual
expropriation cases.3" Similarly, scholars characterize the duty to prevent
transboundary pollution and the precautionary principle as customary
obligations when there is little support for them in the actual behavior of states.
As Jennings concludes, "Perhaps it is time to face squarely the fact that the
orthodox tests of custom-practice and opinio juris-are often not only
inadequate but even irrelevant for the identification of much new law today. 37
II. "DECLARATIVE" INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW38
According to the orthodox account of customary international law, few
principles of international environmental law qualify as customary. Does this
mean that claims about customary international environmental law are simply
mistaken? Perhaps, but I would suggest that these claims may instead reflect
a different conception of customary international law--one that focuses on
what states say rather than what they do. While writers pay lip service to the
traditional account,39 they are really discussing a very different kind of law.
Consider the methodology used to establish the existence of customary
international environmental norms. According to the traditional account, one
would need to undertake a systematic survey of state behavior to determine
whether a norm is part of customary law. For example, with respect to the
duties to assess activities that may cause transboundary harm and to notify
32. Robert Y. Jennings, The Identification of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING
AND PRACTICE 3, 5 (Bin Cheng ed. ,1982) (emphasis in original).
33. See, e.g, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
34. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and
General Principles, 12 AUSTRL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 91-92 (1992).
35. Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the
International Law of Expropriation, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 474,488 (1991).
36. Generally expropriation cases have been resolved through lump sum settlements, in which
considerably less than full compensation has been paid. RIcHARD LILLICH & BURNS WESTON,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS (1975).
37. Robert Y. Jennings, What Is International Law and How Do We Know It When We See I?, 37
ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 59, 67 (1981).
38. Chodosh, supra note 31.
39. See, e.g., Dupuy, supra note 10, at 61 (admitting that "from a strict point of view," customary law
should "consist only of those principles that receive a concrete application in the usual conduct and behavior
of States.").
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potentially affected states, one would need to identify the set of activities that
pose a significant risk of transboundary harm and then examine how often
states undertake assessments and provide notifications. Similarly, with regard
to the duty to prevent significant transboundary pollution, one would need to
determine whether states regularly take action to limit the pollution escaping
their borders.
Needless to say, attempting to induce the rules of customary international
law directly from state practice would be a Herculean task. While legal
writers generally claim to adhere to the traditional account, their assertions
about customary international law are not based on surveys of state behavior,"
nor does their training as lawyers equip them for this task. Even when surveys
of state practice are undertaken--by committees of the International Law
Association for example-the reliability of these efforts is questionable.42 If we
really wanted systematic surveys of state practice, anthropologists and
historians would likely do a better job.
Lawyers tend to be good, not at empirically studying behavior, but rather
interpreting and utilizing texts-for example, cases, statutes, treaties, and
resolutions. And, in writing about "customary" international law, this is
exactly what international lawyers do. They base their arguments on both
written and oral texts, produced in some cases by states, but often by non-state
actors such as courts and arbitral panels,43 intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations,' and legal scholars. Their methodology is to
40. Cf RONALD DwoRKrN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977) (naming his ideal judge
"Hercules"). Zamora comments that only the International Law Commission "in permanent session with
armies of researchers could gather and sift through all the relevant evidence to establish, in a manner
acceptable to social scientists, the existence of a rule of customary international law." See Zamora, supra
note 31, at 38.
41. Schwarzenberger's comment, that "the immense material from which [international custom] may
be gathered has hardly yet been touched by international lawyers," still rings true today. See
Schwarzenberger, supra note 25, at 563-64.
42. The following example from personal experience is illustrative. Currently, I serve on an
International Law Association committee charged with examining coastal state jurisdiction over marine
pollution. As the U.S. member, I was responsible for reporting on U.S. practice. Initially, I expected this
would be a relatively straightforward task. The problem of coastal state jurisdiction is an old one, of which
government officials are well aware and about which they might be expected to keep records. Nonetheless,
it has proven surprisingly difficult to obtain systematic information about incidents of pollution of U.S.
coastal waters by foreign vessels and the subsequent U.S. response. If this information is inaccessible with
regard to the United States, think how much more difficult it must be to obtain for most other states. By
necessity, my report focused on U.S. legislation and regulations, with only anecdotal information about
actual pollution incidents.
43. See Norton, supra note 35, at 497-98 ("Virtually all of the recent opinions [of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal] have placed their principal reliance on judicial and arbitral precedents.").
44. The International Law Association and the Institute of International Law are examples.
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collate these texts to see whether a critical mass of authority exists in support
of a given norm. A perusal of any work on customary international
environmental law confirms that this methodology is the rule, not the
exception. At most, scholars cite one or two celebrated incidents, such as the
Chernobyl or Sandoz accidents, but provide little or no analysis of whether
these incidents typify state behavior. The International Law Association, for
example, concluded that the duty to notify was a norm of customary
international law, citing only seven examples of state practice,45 out of the
presumably countless instances in which states have undertaken activities with
a significant risk of transboundary harm. Instead, emphasis was placed on the
various resolutions and treaties in which the putative customary norm
appeared.'
Discussions of the duty to prevent transboundary pollution provide another
good example of this methodology. Generally, writers begin by citing Trail
Smelter,"7 which after more than fifty years is still the only case in which a
state was held internationally responsible for causing transboundary harm."
Writers then cite to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,49 now joined
by the recent reiteration of this principle (very slightly modified) in the 1992
Rio Declaration. 0 For good measure, references are also usually included to
the O.E.C.D. Council Recommendation Concerning Transfrontier Pollution,"
45. See Partan, supra note 14, at 51. Three of these examples were based on treaties. Even with
respect to the four instances of notification not based on treaty, whether these were made out of a sense of
international legal obligation is, according to Partan, "problematical" and "entirely speculative." Id. at 54.
46. Id. at 51-53.
47. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (Mar. 11, 1941) ("[N]o State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury... in or to the territory of another
or of the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence.").
48. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 l.C.J. 4 (judgment of Apr. 9), also cited by most
scholars in support of the duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm, did not involve transboundary
pollution. Instead, it enunciated the more general principle that a state may not knowingly allow its territory
to be used to injure another state. Id at 22.
49. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, princ. 21, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.11.A.14, pt. 1, ch. 1 (1973), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972)
("States have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.").
50. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31
I.L.M. 876.
5 1. OECD Council Recommendation C(74)224, Nov. 14, 1974, Title B(2), in OECD, OECD AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 142 (1986) (states "should, individually and jointly, take all appropriate measures to prevent
and control transfrontier pollution").
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U.N. General Assembly resolutions," the International Law Association's
Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution,53
various treaties,54 and the numerous international law scholars who have
asserted that customary law imposes a duty to prevent transboundary
environmental harm.5
Of course, the focus on verbal rather than physical practice could reflect
not a search for a different type of legal norm, but merely a methodology for
discovering the rules of state behavior. Just as one might find it easier to learn
the rules of cricket by studying a rules book or by asking someone familiar
with the game rather than through direct observation and induction, it may be
easier to apprehend the rules of state behavior by studying what states say
about customary law rather than by directly observing what they do. This
would be an appropriate methodology when a state's statements and actions
are congruent; when state declarations are a good guide to behavior. In the
environmental realm, however, verbal claims and physical behavior often
diverge. States acknowledge a duty to prevent significant transboundary harm,
but continue to cause such harm; they accept resolutions recommending
assessments and notification, but seldom act accordingly. Consequently,
studying verbal practice appears to be a misguided methodology for
discovering behavior regularities.
In my view, the focus by scholars on verbal practice is not merely
methodological; it represents a fundamentally different ontology of
international law-one that is discursive rather than behavioral in orientation.
International environmental norms reflect not how states regularly behave, but
how states speak to one another. They represent the evaluative standards used
by states to justify their actions and to criticize the actions of others. Writers
52. E.g., Co-operation in the Field of Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or
More States, G.A. Res. 3129 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30A), U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add. 1 (1973).
53. Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, art. 3(1), Int'l Law
Assn., Rep. 60th Conf., at 1-3 (1982) ("States are in their legitimate activities under an obligation to prevent,
abate, and control transfrontier pollution to such an extent that no substantial injury is caused in the territory
of another State.").
54. E.g., U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 194(2), U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/121, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) ("States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities
under their jurisdiction or control are conducted so as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and
their environment.").
55. See, e.g., BiRNt & BOYLE, supra note 9, at 89-95. Dupuy, for example, cites the Trail Smelter
and Corfu Channel cases, Stockholm Principle 21, several U.N. General Assembly resolutions, OECD
Council recommendations, the Helsinki Final Act, and the UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct on Shared
Natural Resources. Dupuy, supra note 10, at 64-65. As far as "concrete cases" of state practice are
concerned, however, he notes that states "seem partly to ignore" the rule prohibiting transboundary
pollution. Id. at 66.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
persist in characterizing these norms as "customary," the catch-all term
generally applied to any non-treaty norm, 6 but it would be more accurate to
distinguish this type of norm from custom. Chodosh has suggested the term
"declarative law.""'  A more pointed characterization is "myth system,""8 since
these norms represent the collective ideals of the international community,
which at present have the quality of fictions or half-truths.59
III. THE ROLE OF "DECLARATIVE" LAW
Assuming that so-called customary international environmental norms
represent regularities in discourse rather than regularities in state behavior,
what difference then do these norms make? Should we care about whether this
myth system counts as international law and, if so, why?
In thinking about these questions, it is useful to distinguish between three
ways to implement and enforce legal norms: by courts and arbitral tribunals
(third-party control); through voluntary compliance (first-party control); and
through interactions among the subjects of the legal system (second-party
control).6 Third-party control-the paradigm of domestic legal systems--is the
easiest situation. Where the possibility of adjudication or arbitration exists, the
distinction between legal and non-legal norms matters, since courts will
56. See Chodosh, supra note 31, at 88. Another possibility is that these norms represent "general
principles of law." See Partan, supra note 14, at 72 (duty to inform is a general principle of law). This at
least brings them under the rubric of one of the accepted sources of international law (although arguably
with little advance in understanding, since the category of "general principles" has no well-accepted
meaning). Cf Schwarzenberger, supra note 25, at 549 (criticizing the resort to general principles of law as
a means of avoiding the need to research state practice). Most international environmental principles,
however, do not fit within any of the proposed theories of "general principles of law." They are not
principles of legal logic, nor do they appear to represent principles common to most national legal systems.
Although traces of the precautionary principle can be found in U.S. and European environmental law,
generalizing from this to the rest of the world reflects a Eurocentric view. TIMOTHY O'RoRDAN & JAMES
CAMERON, INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (1994). Finally, they do not represent principles
of natural law. Although their proponents tend to defend them in natural law terms (i.e., as necessary to
cope with international environmental problems), the primary authority for their legal status is positivist.
Scholars justify these norms not in terms of abstract justice, but by reference to certain kinds of evidence,
including U.N. General Assembly resolutions, treaties, reports of experts groups, and the writings of other
international law scholars.
57. Chodosh, supra note 31.
58. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES 15-36 (1979) (discussing the difference between "myth
system" and "operational code").
59. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1196 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "myth" as a story "delineating
the psychology, customs, or ideals of society" and as "a fiction or half-truth, especially one that forms part
of an ideology").
60. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 126-27
(1991) (distinguishing between systems of first-, second-, and third-party control).
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enforce legal but not non-legal norms." Debates about whether a norm is part
of international law are not purely academic, for if one can convince a court
that a norm represents the law, then that court can apply and enforce the norm.
A good illustration is the Filartiga v. Pena-Irala case,62 in which the
plaintiff persuaded the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that customary
international law prohibits torture. The possibility of judicial enforcement
gave significance to the debate about whether the prohibition on torture is
customary. The same situation prevails in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
which has applied the "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation formula
as part of customary international law.63
In my view, most writers on customary international environmental law
instinctively assume a state of affairs where third-party dispute resolution is
available, and subconsciously address their arguments to legal decisionmakers,
such as courts and arbitrators.' These legal decisionmakers are the real target
audience for the voluminous writings on customary international
environmental law.65 The problem is that courts and arbitral tribunals currently
play only a relatively minor role in addressing international environmental
issues.' Third-party dispute resolution has resolved few environmental
problems.67 That is why Trail Smelter must bear such a heavy load in current
scholarship on customary international environmental law. The establishment
of an environmental chamber of the International Court of Justice and the
recent cases between Nauru and Australia and between Hungary and Slovakia
may signal the emergence of a greater judicial role. But, at present, legal
discourse that presupposes a judicial audience plays to a largely empty house.
Of course, even when judicial enforcement is unavailable, norms may still
affect behavior by exerting a compliance pull on states. 6 Non-legal as well as
61. See Bothe, supra note 8, at 87.
62. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
63. Sedco v. National Iranian Oil Co., 10 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 180 (1986 1), 25 I.L.M. 629, 631
(1986).
64. Legal arguments are also addressed to legislatures, but here the arguments are normative rather
than descriptive; they concern what the law should be, not what it is.
65. See Hans Baade, Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises: An Introductory Survey, in
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 407, 413 (Norbert Horn ed.,
1980) ("[W]henever the volume of learned comment outstrips the supply of 'hard' decisional law, and
especially wherever scholarly discussion starts to feed on itself, it loses touch with reality.").
66. In a few international regimes, such as the European Union and the World Trade Organization,
the situation is different, but these regimes remain the exception.
67. Thus far, domestic courts have infrequently applied international environmental norms, in contrast
to human rights norms, which have often been the subject of litigation in U.S. courts.
68. See FRANCK, supra note 26. This factor is stressed by Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and
the Success of International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (1995).
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legal norms may exert such a pull. Moral norms, for example, can influence
behavior through the operation of conscience.69 But, arguably, the legal status
of a norm enhances its influence.7' If people feel that the "secondary" rules for
the creation of law are legitimate, then they are likely to accept a rule produced
through that lawmaking process, whether they like the substance of the rule or
not. Much compliance with law results from this voluntary mechanism.7
Does declarative international environmental law exert a significant
compliance pull on states? Again, I am not aware of any empirical studies of
this question, but my intuition is that the answer is no. First, at least some
important states do not accept the secondary rule of law formation underlying
declarative law--i.e., that commonly repeated statements in treaties,
declarations, and the like create general norms of behavior, applicable to the
entire range of state action, not just the more specific areas where the norms
were originally propounded. Second, in the absence of judicial enforcement,
customary norms must have a relatively high degree of specificity in order to
exert a constraining influence on states.72 Indeed, the determinacy of norms--
the degree to which they establish certainty of expectations about future
action--may influence compliance more than their legal or non-legal character.
The declarative rules of international environmental law, however, are very
general and provide little specific guidance to states.73 States are told, for
example, to avoid significant transboundary pollution, but what constitutes
"significant"? They ought to undertake precautionary action, but in what
circumstances and to what degree? As a result of this vagueness, states may
basically do what they like and argue that their actions are consistent with
customary international law.
Given the rarity of third-party dispute resolution, and the weak compliance
pull exerted by "declarative" international environmental norms, the biggest
69. Similarly, political obligations undertaken in solemn form, such as the Helsinki Final Act, are
often taken seriously by states and exert a compliance pull. Bothe, supra note 8, at 85.
70. Id. at 78 (states find it somewhat easier not to comply with resolutions that are not legally binding,
but this is only one factor among many in determining actual compliance).
71. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
72. See FRANCK, supra note 26, at 52 (arguing that the determinacy of rules is an important factor in
their legitimacy).
73. See Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1484, 1504-
05 (1991); Ian Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 179, 179 (1973). Dupuy argues that customary international environmental norms are no
more vague than domestic norms such as good faith or due process. Dupuy, supra note 10, at 69. The
difference, however, is that courts can give more specific meaning to domestic norms in the context of
concrete cases. In contrast, the general unavailability of international adjudication implies that norms such
as the duty to prevent transboundary pollution remain vague.
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potential influence of these norms is on second-party control mechanisms.
Most international environmental issues are resolved through mechanisms
such as negotiations, rather than through third-party dispute settlement or
unilateral changes of behavior. In this second-party control process,
international environmental norms can play a significant role by setting the
terms of the debate, providing evaluative standards, serving as a basis to
criticize other states' actions, and establishing a framework of principles
within which negotiations may take place to develop more specific norms,
usually in treaties. Consider, for example, the role of the duty to prevent
transboundary harm in the U.S.-Canada acid rain dispute. This norm did not
directly constrain the United States; but it arguably had an indirect effect by
providing a shared normative framework for the negotiations that led
ultimately to the 1991 U.S.-Canada Air Quality Agreement. 74 To the extent the
norm influenced state behavior, it was through this indirect mechanism.
My hypothesis, however, is that these functions of international
environmental norms do not depend on a norm's legal status. Whether the
duty to prevent transboundary pollution or the precautionary principle are part
of customary international law, they will set the terms of international
discussions and serve as the framework for negotiations. If so, the current
debates over the legal versus non-legal status of these norms are of little
consequence. They would matter if dispute resolution were more prevalent.
But so long as courts and arbitrators play a minor role, these debates will
remain a sideshow. Rather than continue them, our time and efforts would be
better spent attempting to translate the general norms of international
environmental relations into concrete treaties and actions.
74. U.S.-Canada Air Quality Agreement, Mar. 31, 1991,30 I.L.M. 676 (1991).

